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In 1987, I published an overly long article in the Yale Law
Journal entitled Of Sovereignty and Federalism.1 In it, I advanced a
"converse-1983" model of federalism-a model that highlighted the
ways in which state laws can provide remedies when federal officials
violate federal constitutional rights. For example, prior to the 1971
landmark of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents,2 citizens whose
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by federal officers had no
clear federal cause of action; but state trespass law often provided a
remedy, and enabled citizens to recover when their "persons, houses,
papers, [or] effects" had been unreasonably searched or seized by
federal officials. 3 The point, I suggested, was generalizable. State
remedies could often protect citizens against unconstitutional behav-
ior by federal officers, just as federal remedies-such as Section
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J. 1425 (1987).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. U.S. Coast., Amend. IV.
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1983-could often protect citizens against unconstitutional behavior
by state officials. Rightly understood, "federalism" should protect
citizens and limit government abuse-in contrast to the Supreme
Court's regular invocation of "Our Federalism" to deny citizens full
remedies for constitutional wrongs.4 Concretely, I argued in 1987 that
states should adopt "converse-1983" statutes that might invoke and
invert the language of section 1983 as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of [the United States], subjects or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of [this state] or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States]
Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress.5
The first draft of this overly long 1987 article was even longer
still. Early on, I sketched out four competing models of federalism as
foils for my own "converse-1983" model. Eventually, I decided to omit
this entire section for space reasons. I put the out-take in a drawer.
And there it sat, collecting dust, until Barry Friedman phoned
to invite me to participate in this symposium on "Federalism's
Future." I fished the out-take from my drawer, dusted it off, and re-
read it. What I read seemed precisely relevant to federalism's fu-
ture-especially because of certain post-1987 developments in the
Supreme Court that lead me to hope that the Court is moving in di-
rections congenial to "converse-1983."
In Part I of what follows, I shall present-with only minor
emendations-my original out-take from Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, contrasting the "converse-1983" model with competing
conceptions of federalism. In Part II, I shall describe the post-1987
developments in Supreme Court case law that lead me to hope that
"converse-1983" can indeed play an important role in federalism's
future.
I. FOUR VIEWS OF FEDERALISM
One's view of federalism often hinges on how one conceptu-
alizes states. Each of the four perspectives below focuses on one par-
4. See, for example, Amar, 96 Yale L. J. at 1425-26 & nn.3-6 (cited in note 1).
5. Id. at 1513 (emphasis added).
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ticular attribute of American states. The first views states as consti-
tutional wrongdoers; the second, as experimental and educational
laboratories; the third, as decentralized political competitors; and the
fourth, as guardians of legal rights. Each of these views is true in
some ways. States are all of these things. And yet each perspective is
importantly incomplete-as incomplete as the report of each fabled
blind man describing what an elephant is "truly" like. After consider-
ing each view as thus far developed in case law and scholarly com-
mentary, we will stand in a much better position to recognize certain
features of federalism that none of these views seems to capture fully.
A. The '"ationalist" Perspective: States as Wrongdoers
In challenging the Supreme Court's misguided invocation of
state sovereignty at the expense of individual constitutional rights,
foes of government misconduct often slip into some version of the
following "nationalist" argument:
States pose serious threats to the constitutional liberty of citizens but the
federal government stands as the special protector of these liberties. At least
that much was established at Appomattox, if not at Philadelphia-by the Civil
War Amendments, if not by the Federalist No. 10. Thus, the way to maximize
constitutional liberty is to strengthen federal power and suppress 'states'
rights.6
There is some truth in the nationalist argument; but its per-
spective is skewed. The nationalist correctly notes that a strong na-
tional government, by policing state compliance with constitutional
norms, can reduce and remedy state threats to individual liberty.
Section 1983 looms as a towering example. Indeed, the entire
Federalist effort to establish a stronger and more stable central gov-
ernment in the late 1780s drew much of its inspiration from the
widely perceived need to create a secure bulwark protecting individ-
ual rights against abusive state governments. In this respect, the
Reconstruction amendments simply fortified the ideological founda-
tions of the original Constitution. Yet a strong national government
also poses threats to constitutional liberty. Who will stand guard
against these threats?
The nationalist's answer is quick and sure: the national judici-
ary. Once again, there is much truth here, but the picture is incom-
6. The work of my teacher, friend, and colleague, Owen Fiss, comes to mind here.
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plete. We also need to see how the very existence of states and state-
created legal remedies can help police the national government's
compliance with constitutional norms. Obliterating "states' rights"
would ultimately weaken individual constitutional remedies against
the national government.
Ironically, both the nationalist and the Supreme Court (in its
"Our Federalism" line of cases) commit similar mistakes. Each
adopts too pessimistic a view about the state's capacity to respect
constitutional norms. By undermining the ability of national courts to
enforce state compliance with the Constitution, the Supreme Court
winks at state lawlessness and trivializes state governments. The
ultimate image of state sovereignty is a degraded one; sovereignty is
invoked to defend judicial passivity when the state has done what no
sovereign state may permissibly do-namely, violate the federal
Constitution. It is exactly this degraded image of state governments
that the nationalist shares and reacts against. But the nationalist
overreacts. By accepting the Supreme Court's implicit assumption
that state sovereignty is ultimately at war with the full enjoyment of
individual constitutional rights (for if it were not, how could "states'
rights" and "state sovereignty" plausibly be marshaled to defeat such
rights?) the nationalist overlooks the promising strategy of enlisting
the states in a campaign to promote constitutional rights by
"checking" the national government's abuses of power.
Thus, the nationalist meets the Supreme Court's sloppy slogan
of "state sovereignty" with the ringing cry of "national supremacy."
Yet the nationalist has misdrawn the battle line. In the end, both
mottos miss the central message of the Constitution: neither the
state nor the nation can be supreme, because both must be subordi-
nated to the ultimate supremacy of the ultimate law-the
Constitution itself. Both "states' rights" and "national rights" exist to
promote, and must ultimately yield to, citizens' rights that the
Constitution creates or declares. Both sets of limited sovereigns must
be kept within the limitations imposed on their sovereignty by the
ultimate Sovereign-We the People of the United States who ordained
and established those limitations. Indeed, we need to see how the
Constitution contains various mechanisms by which both states'
rights and national rights may be pressed into the service of citizens'
constitutional rights.
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B. The "Laboratory" Perspective: States as
Experimenters and Educators
Let us next consider what I shall call the "laboratory" perspec-
tive, a perspective closely associated with Felix Frankfurter and Louis
Brandeis. In 1930, Frankfurter (then still a Harvard Professor) of-
fered the following critique of overzealous judicial enforcement of
substantive due process against state economic regulation:
Opportunity must be allowed for vindicating reasonable belief by experience.
The very notion of our federalism calls for the free play of local diversity in
dealing with local problems.... [J]udicial nullification on grounds of constitu-
tionality stops experimentation at its source, and bars increase to the fund of
social knowledge by scientific tests of trial and error ....
Two years later, Justice Brandeis echoed this theme, and explicitly
introduced the "laboratory" metaphor, in his now-famous dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.8
More recently, Justice O'Connor has attempted to develop the
laboratory model in greater detail in her dissent in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi:
[T]he 50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new social,
economic, and political ideas. This state innovation is no judicial myth. When
Wyoming became a State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women to
vote. That novel idea did not bear national fruit for another 30 years.
Wisconsin pioneered unemployment insurance, while Massachusetts initiated
minimum wage laws for women and minors....
In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism enhances the op-
portunity of all citizens to participate in representative government. Alexis de
Tocqueville understood well that participation in local government is a corner-
stone of American democracy .... If we want to preserve the ability of citizens
7. Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government 49-50 (Yale U., 1930).
8. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Justice Holmes' 1921
dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating, "There
is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the
absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important
part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states ... ).
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to learn democratic processes through participation in local government, citi-
zens must retain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local prob-
lems.9
As developed in these texts, the laboratory perspective yields a
vivid set of images and metaphors highlighting two critical compo-
nents of American federalism. First, federalism permits pragmatic
testing of novel policy proposals. State laboratories are practical and
empirical. In effect, innovative states can conduct controlled legisla-
tive "experiments" whose results can be monitored and interpreted by
"scientific policymakers." Data may be collected and compiled, com-
parisons (both spatial and temporal) performed, hypotheses tested,
and sound policy conclusions derived and applied elsewhere, if appro-
priate. The apparent linkage between the laboratory perspective and
American Progressivism is unsurprising, given the perspective's par-
entage.
Second, federalism operates to edify and engage the citizenry.
State laboratories are educational and participatory. They offer citi-
zens clinical seminars in democratic self-government. If the first view
of state laboratories may be deemed Progressive, this second view
may conveniently be classified as Populist. The Progressive conceives
of the laboratory as a testing ground for professional policymakers;
the Populist views the laboratory as a training ground for ordinary
citizens. For the Progressive, state and local governments are policy
laboratories; for the Populist, political laboratories.
The linguistic contrast between Professor Frankfurter and
Justice Brandeis on one hand, and Justice O'Connor on the other, is
noteworthy here. Professor Frankfurter speaks of "vindicating rea-
sonable belief by experience" (that is, empirically testing plausible hy-
potheses), and of the need to "increase . . . the fund of social
knowledge by scientific tests of trial and error."O Similarly, Justice
Brandeis explicitly, if somewhat loosely, declares a "right to
experiment."" Both men are primarily concerned with protecting
states' "social and economic" legislation from the superimposition of
judicial policy preferences cloaked in the rhetoric of due process and
9. 456 U.S. 742, 788-91 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
10. Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government at 49-50 (emphasis added) (cited in note
7).
11. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 771 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Note also the clear
scientific motif sounded by Justice Holmes' reference in Truax to experimentation in "insulated
chambers." Truax, 257 U.S. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Justice O'Connor's opinion has a
different flavor. To be sure, she does not abandon the Progressive
insight-she, too, seeks to encourage local "experimentation" and
points to successful "social" and "economic" experiments-but she
garnishes the insight with a colorful assortment of Populist images.
She adds the word "political" to Justice Brandeis' duo of "social and
economic"; she recounts Wyoming's extension of political participation
rights to women; she associates state laboratories with political
"ideas"; she summons up a vision of "citizens" learning "democratic
processes through participation in local government"; and she
explicitly invokes Alexis de Tocqueville. 12
Consider also the dissenting remarks of Justice Powell in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: "It is at...
state and local levels-not in Washington as the Court so mistakenly
thinks-that 'democratic self-government' is best exemplified.' 13 In
other passages, Justice Powell appears to weave Progressive and
Populist strands together by arguing that state laboratories are more
efficient precisely because state officials are more accessible and
democratically responsive than federal officials. 4
Like the nationalist perspective, however, the laboratory per-
spective distorts even as it illuminates. If the nationalist slights the
role of the states in "checking" the nation, the laboratory perspective
simply reverses the skew by ignoring the role of the nation in policing
the states. Indeed, the laboratory perspective fails to offer any af-
firmative account whatsoever of national legislation. At best, it leaves
us with a weak negative implication that in some areas local experi-
mentation may be inappropriate. (But why?)
The perspective's emphasis on the virtues of state experimen-
tation also argues for a narrow understanding of constitutional limi-
tations on state power. It argues for judicial restraint in policing the
Fourteenth Amendment. The only individual "rights" the perspective
vaguely champions are majoritarian rights of political participation.
The perspective devotes little attention to protecting other federal
individual rights against "experimentation" by local and perhaps
temporary majorities. Of course, all this should not be surprising
given the perspective's provenance-its articulation in response to
12. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 456 U.S. at 788-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
13. 469 U.S. 528, 577 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 575-76.
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vigorous judicial review under the Due Process Clause-and its
obvious intellectual connection to the Progressive and Populist
movements, neither of which is closely associated with
countermajoritarian individual rights or judicial review.15  By
contrast, the Madisonian view exemplified by "converse-1983" has a
rather different intellectual lineage.
C. The "Political Market" Perspective: States
as Decentralized Competitors
Closely connected with the laboratory perspective is what I
shall label the "political market" perspective. In the passage immedi-
ately following her invocation of de Tocqueville, Justice O'Connor
writes:
Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on governmental
power. As Justice Harlan once explained, our ancestors "were suspicious of
every form of all-powerful central authority."... To curb this evil, they both
allocated governmental power between state and national authorities, and di-
vided the national power among three branches of government.'
6
Justice Powell argued in a similar vein in Garcia: 'The Framers
believed that the separate sphere of sovereignty reserved to the states
would ensure that the states would serve as an effective 'counterpoise'
to the power of the federal government." 7
Both of these passages focus on how federalism diffuses and
decentralizes political power. One virtue of decentralization is diver-
sity: states can generate a wide range of legislative policies that can
accommodate sharply divergent local needs and political preferences.
(Recall in this regard Frankfurter's observation that "federalism calls
for the free play of local diversity in dealing with local problems.") 8
15. For an interesting illustration of the possible tension between the judicial restraint
and the states' rights components of the laboratory model when dealing with congressional
legislation challenged on federalism grounds, compare Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J.)
(citing Brandeis' dissent in New State Ice for the principle of judicial restraint) with id. at 568
n.13 (Powell, J. dissenting) (citing the New State Ice dissent for the principle of state autonomy
and criticizing the majority's invocation of Brandeis' "laboratory" language).
16. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 456 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
17. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 571. See also Justice Powell, writing for the Court, in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985): "The Framers believed that the states
played a vital role in our system and that strong state governments were essential to serve as a
counterpoise to the power of the Federal Government."
18. See text accompanying note 7.
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That diversity, in turn, offers citizens a true "choice of laws": indi-
viduals may "domicile shop" for the place with the most appealing
bundle of local laws, customs, and attitudes. Citizens willing to
shoulder heavier taxes in exchange for better streets and schools may
choose to live in State A; others may opt for State B. A centralized
regime of one-size-fits-all national uniformity denies federalism's rich
diversity and its corresponding possibilities for citizen choice and self-
selection. The image of centralized government is one of an unhappy
compromise that leaves everyone somewhat dissatisfied: some will
condemn "inadequate" public services, while others will curse
"oppressive" taxation.
This self-selection feature of federalism is not explicitly devel-
oped by Justice O'Connor, but seems implicit in her overall argument.
Indeed, the 1890 Wyoming suffrage law she invokes nicely illustrates
federalism's opportunities for "domicile shopping." Perhaps Wyoming
extended the franchise to women in order to induce more women to
immigrate there. By allowing them to vote with their hands,
Wyoming encouraged them to vote with their feet.
These observations lead to the central insight of the political
market perspective: federalism structures competition between gov-
ernments. At one level, states compete against the national govern-
ment. States operate as "an effective 'counterpoise' to," and a
"salutary check on," federal power. As Justice O'Connor suggests,
there is a useful analogy here between separation of powers and
federalism-the two great structural principles of the Constitution.
By dividing national power among three separate and equal branches,
the Constitution sets up competing political institutions whose politi-
cal jealousy serves to diffuse power and prevent "[t]he accumulation of
all powers ... in the same hands[, which is] the very definition of
tyranny."'19 A similar dynamic of political jealousy operates in the
structure of federalism. The very existence of states counters the
perhaps otherwise irresistible gravitation of all power toward
Washington, D.C. The classic formulation of the point, of course, is
James Madison's Federalist No. 51:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer
each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others.... Ambition must be made to counteract
19. Federalist No. 47 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 300, 301
(Mentor, 1961).
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ambition.... [Y]ou must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself...
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of bet-
ter motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, pri-
vate as well as public.... [T]he constant aim is to divide and arrange the sev-
eral offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other-that
the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public
rights ....
... In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments
will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled itself.20
The parallels between Madison's model of political competition
and Adam Smith's (then recent) model of economic competition are
both self-conscious-witness Madison's reference to "private as well
as public!' incentive systems-and powerful. Both models rely on
overarching incentive structures to harness individual self-interest
(whether personal political ambition and jealousy or the desire for
profit) in a way that promotes some larger public good (whether
"public rights" or consumer welfare). Both models depend on competi-
tion to further liberty and forestall undesirable concentrations of
power (whether tyranny or monopoly).
Competition also operates among the states. The political
market theorists do not dwell on this point. Frankfurter's phrase
about the "free play of local diversity"21 is perhaps suggestive, but,
once again, it seems implicit in the political market vision. The coun-
terpart of citizen choice and self-selection is state competition for the
allegiance of citizens: if Wyoming wanted to win women over, it in
effect had to compete for them by bidding them away from other
states. Indeed, the political market model's account of legislative
diversity and citizen self-selection closely tracks the microeconomist's
account of product differentiation under conditions of imperfect
competition, as the very metaphor of "domicile shopping" suggests.
In the end, the political market perspective on federalism is
powerful but, once again, incomplete for our purposes. Although the
perspective begins to focus attention on the competition among states,
the mechanisms and full implications of this feature of federalism
remain somewhat obscure. In particular, we need to understand
20. Federalist No. 51 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 320, 321-23
(Mentor, 1961).
21. Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government at 49 (cited in note 7) (emphasis added).
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more clearly how "horizontal" interstate competition can exert impor-
tant pulls on the vectors of "vertical" state-national competition.
The political market perspective's focus on "vertical" competi-
tion is sharper. Justice O'Connor's suggestion that federalism
"provides a salutary check" on the power of the national government
points us in exactly the right direction. Even more promising is her
explicit analogy between federalism and separation of powers.
Yet, once again, the promise of the perspective is only partially
fulfilled. Justices O'Connor and Powell give us some notion of how
federalism's diffusion of political power serves to promote liberty, but
this is only a part of the complete picture. Madison, after all, sug-
gests that the government's structure will create incentives to protect
"the rights of the people" and "control" against governmental
"encroachments.22 His point seems crisper and more precise than the
simple suggestion that diffusion of political power will generally
prevent tyranny. Rather, his Federalist No. 51 implies that the
Constitution's structure of government will help assure compliance
with the specific legal rights established in that same document.23
Indeed, it is exactly here that the analogy between separation
of powers and federalism invites more careful attention than Justice
O'Connor affords, for separation of powers plainly has a legal as well
as a political dimension; it establishes structures and institu-
tions-like judicial review-whose very purpose is to assure govern-
mental compliance with the individual legal rights embodied in the
Constitution. A "converse-1983" model helps us see how federalism
has similar structural features that promote individual constitutional
rights.
Finally, the political market model-at least in these passages
from Justices O'Connor and Powell-seems slanted, though less so,
perhaps, than its laboratory counterpart. Whereas the two justices
22. Federalist No. 51 (Madison) at 322-23 (cited in note 20) (emphasis added).
23. See also Federalist No. 48 (Madison):
[Plower is of an encroaching nature and... ought to be effectually restrained from
passing the limits assigned to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several
classes of power... the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security
for each, against the invasion of the others.... [It is not] sufficient to mark, with preci-
sion, the boundaries of these departments in the constitution of the government, and to
trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power.... [Tihe
powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of
magistracy as that no one could transcend their legal limits without being effectually
checked and restrained by the others.
Federalist No. 48 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 308, 308-11 (Mentor,
1961) (emphases added).
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stress state "counterpoise[s]" to, and "salutary checks" against, the
"all-powerful central authority" of the national government, Madison's
Federalist No. 51 speaks more symmetrically of the "different gov-
ernments... control[ling] each other.24
D. The "Safeguard" Perspective: States as Guardians of Legal Rights
A somewhat different perspective emerges from two classic
articles, one penned by Professor Herbert Wechsler 25 and the other by
Justice William Brennan. 26 Each author describes how federalism can
safeguard certain legal rights-for Professor Wechsler, states' rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution; for Justice Brennan, individ-
ual rights protected by state constitutions. The two articles address
different issues, and travel down different paths. Nevertheless, for
our purposes here, we may usefully consider the two back-to-back,
under the general rubric of the "safeguard" perspective.
1. Professor Wechsler's "Political Safeguards"
Renovating the analysis of various Federalist Papers,
Professor Wechsler's classic article on "the political safeguards of
federalism" refocuses attention on the role of states in constituting
the national government's political branches. Under the provisions
hammered out at Philadelphia, state legislators would directly select
Senators, and each state would receive equal representation qua
state. In the House, apportionment of Representatives would be by
state-with each state entitled to at least one seat, regardless of
size-and electoral qualifications would mirror those defined by state
law for state legislatures. Moreover, the Constitution gave state
legislatures the power to prescribe the relevant voting and districting
regulations in the first instance, subject to Congressional revision.
Finally, state legislators could choose the electoral college that would
select the President; in the absence of an electoral college majority for
any candidate, the choice would devolve upon the state delegations in
the House, with each state delegation given one vote. In short, the
states were built into the very structure of the national government;
24. Federalist No. 51 (Madison) at 323 (cited in note 20) (emphasis added).
25. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954).
26. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
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they were made "constituent and essential" components of the new
nation's political branches.27
Of course, the structure of national office-holding today de-
parts from Madison's blueprint in important respects. A system of
nationwide parties has taken shape; the people of each state vote.
directly for Senators and Presidential electors; and much election law
has been constitutionalized. Nevertheless, Wechsler argued that:
Madison's analysis has never lost its thrust....
The point is so clear in the Senate that, as Madison observed of the equal-
ity accorded to the states, it "does not call for much discussion."...
... [Tihe composition of the Senate is intrinsically calculated to prevent
intrusion from the center on subjects that dominant state interests wish
preserved for state control.
Even the House is slanted somewhat in the same direction, though the
incidence is less severe....
Federalist considerations [also] play an important part even in the
selection of the President, although a lesser part than many of the Framers
must have contemplated. 28
Several conclusions follow from this line of analysis. First, in
the political competition between state and national officials, state
and local interests enjoy a built-in competitive advantage. The very
composition-the constitution-of national offices creates strong
political incentives for national office-holders to attend to state and
local concerns:
[Tihe states are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and
opinion, the special centers of political activity, the separate geographical
determinants of national as well as local politics....
... Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the in-
herent tendency in our system is precisely the reverse, necessitating the widest
support before intrusive measures of importance can receive significant con-
sideration, reacting readily to opposition grounded in resistance within the
states. 29
Thus far Wechsler's argument builds upon the political market
perspective's emphasis on both political competition and diffusion of
political power. He offers a clear account of exactly how the
Constitution's structural incentive mechanisms translate the former
27. Wechsler, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 546 (cited in note 25) (quoting Federalist No. 46
(Madison)).
28. Id. at 546-48, 557 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 546, 558.
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into the latter. He moves beyond the suggestive language of
"counterpoises" and "checks," and into a structural analysis of politi-
cal incentives.
Yet Wechsler's argument contains an even more important
move for our purposes here. He does not stop with an account of how
federalism diffuses political power, but goes on to suggest that the
Constitution's federal structure also helps to enforce that instru-
ment's legal clauses limiting national power:
It is in light of this inherent [centrifugal] tendency, reflected most
importantly in Congress, that the governmental power distribution clauses of
the Constitution gain their largest meaning as an instrument for the
protection of the states. Those clauses, as is well known, have served far more
to qualify or stop intrusive legislative measures in the Congress than to
invalidate enacted legislation in the Supreme Court.3.
Any national attempt to legislate beyond the Constitution's enumera-
tions of national power will likely meet fierce political opposition
within the national government itself. Wechsler thus explains how
the federal structure furnishes built-in political safeguards for the
constitutionally-protected residuary rights of state governments.
As with the other perspectives we have canvassed, however,
Wechsler's argument fails to develop fully certain important implica-
tions of federalism that I mean to highlight with my "converse-1983"
model. Wechsler shows how the structure of federalism can vindicate
the states' rights against the national government-rights embodied
in what Wechsler calls the "distribution clauses" of the Constitution
(like the Commerce Clause)3 1 --but fails to suggest how federalism
might protect various citizens' rights embodied in other clauses limit-
ing national power. Once again, we must recall Madison's words in
Federalist No. 51, which speak not of the rights of states, but rather
of "the rights of the people.'32
Moreover, Wechsler's argument seems almost as imbalanced
as the O'Connor/Powell political market model; we get a far richer
account of the way that states can keep the national government in
constitutional check than vice versa. The "political safeguards" ar-
gument also echoes the laboratory perspective's plea for judicial re-
straint. Because states generally can protect their rights through the
30. Id. at 558.
31. Id.
32. Federalist No. 51 (Madison) at 323 (cited in note 20).
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political process, "the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of
the states, whose representatives control the legislative process and,
by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged
Act of Congress.'33
To be sure, there is a vital difference between the laboratory
perspective's argument for judicial restraint in policing states and
Wechsler's argument for judicial restraint in protecting them. In both
cases, however, the focus on the political branches tends to slight the
constitutional role of Article III courts. Politics tends to displace
adjudication-as most graphically illustrated by the neo-Wechslerian
arguments of Dean Jesse Choper that the judiciary should treat con-
stitutional limitations on national power in the "distribution clauses"
as nonjusticiable.34
In sum, Wechsler's major breakthrough is in pointing us to a
more precise parallel between federalism and separation of powers:
both serve not only to diffuse political power but also to protect enu-
merated constitutional rights. Yet the "political safeguards" argu-
ment tends to present federalism and separation of powers as mutu-
ally exclusive structural devices to enforce different constitutional
clauses. The federal structure protects the legal rights of states,
while judicial review protects the legal rights of individuals. The
suggested specialization of labor is powerful and elegant, but the
picture is nonetheless incomplete. We need to see how the political
competition of federalism also supports judicial review's protection of
individual rights. Political competition can generate the legal reme-
dies and causes of action that enable individual citizens to vindicate
their federal constitutional claims in courts of law.
2. Justice Brennan's 'Double Source of Protection"
The final view of federalism to be considered is also associated
with a classic article: Justice Brennan's State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights.35 Justice Brennan begins by noting
that state constitutions often contain provisions with wording similar,
or even identical, to the phrasing of "counterpart" provisions of the
33. Wechsler, 54 Colum. L. Rev at 559 (cited in note 25).
34. See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale L. J. 1552 (1977). Compare Garcia, 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
35. Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (cited in note 26).
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federal Bill of Rights.36 Yet state judges, Justice Brennan notes, need
not construe these state constitution provisions identically to the
Supreme Court's construction of their federal counterparts. Of
course, the federal Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
establishes a minimum baseline-a floor-that state judges must
respect upon penalty of reversal. But the floor need not become a
ceiling. State courts are free to go "beyond" the federal minimum by
interpreting state constitutional provisions "as guaranteeing citizens
of their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even
those identically phrased."37
Justice Brennan notes a nascent trend among state judiciaries
in this direction-perhaps, he suggests, in response to the Burger
Court's retrenchment of federal constitutional rights in the areas of
due process, equal protection, criminal procedure, and free speech.
He celebrates this state trend in the name of federalism:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of federal law....
This pattern of state court decisions puts to rest the notion that state con-
stitutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal Bill of Rights....
[P]rior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, these state bills of rights,
independently interpreted, were the primary restraints on state action since
the federal Bill of Rights had been held inapplicable....
Every believer in our concept of federalism, and I am a devout believer,
must salute this development in our state courts. 39
In some respects, Justice Brennan's argument simply restates
the laboratory perspective, but alters the emphasis. The laboratory
perspective argues for a narrow understanding of federal constitu-
tional restrictions on states; Justice Brennan merely adds that given
this (Burger Court) perspective on federal constitutional rights, states
should feel free to experiment by going beyond the federal minimum.
Precisely because one size of rights does not fit all states, the Burger
Court's limited reading of federal rights should not be understood as
fixing a maximum as well as a minimum.
This celebration of federalism seems rather weak. By appear-
ing to accept the underlying premises of the laboratory perspective
36. Id. at 495.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 495-98.
39. Id. at 491, 501-02.
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(perhaps for tactical reasons), all Justice Brennan seems to be saying
is that states need not necessarily be as oppressive to citizens as the
federal government and federal constitution allow them to be. The
nationalist might counter by pointing out that if state power were
abolished altogether-or at least, if the national courts enforced fed-
eral constitutional rights against states with appropriate
vigor-individuals would not need additional state-created rights and
remedies against the abusive exercise of state power. Alas, Justice
Brennan's theory offers no strong affirmative case for states.
Thus, while Professor Wechsler shows how federalism safe-
guards the federal constitutional rights of states, Justice Brennan
adds that federalism also safeguards the state constitutional rights of
individuals; yet neither offers a fully satisfactory account of how fed-
eralism also safeguards the federal constitutional rights of individu-
als. A "converse-1983" model of federalism tries to color in this blank
patch of canvass.
Even with its limited scope, however, Justice Brennan's thesis
is noteworthy. First, by welcoming the development of state constitu-
tional rights against the state itself, Justice Brennan champions indi-
vidual interests that may well be countermajoritarian. His emphasis
on "individual liberties," on "restraints on state action," and on state
constitutions above ordinary state laws, represents an important shift
in tone from the seeming statism of the laboratory perspective.
Justice Brennan also offers a strong defense of judicial activism-at
least for the state judiciaries. (Indeed, he goes so far as to offer his
state court sisters and brothers a detailed recipe for insulating their
activist decisions from Supreme Court review. Consider also his
blunt citation of an article entitled The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court.)40 Once again,
this represents an important shift in tone.
Most important for our purposes is Justice Brennan's recogni-
tion that "our federal system.., provides a double source of protec-
tion for the rights of our citizens."'41 Justice Brennan is obviously
thinking here of rights against states. But his recognition that a fed-
eral system offers citizens two sets of laws that restrain abuses of
state power invites us to ask whether federalism also involves any
"double source of protection" against abuses of power by the national
government. Indeed, Justice Brennan goes on to note that "state
40. Id. at 500-01 & n.76.
41. Id. at 503.
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courts can breathe new life into the federal due process clause by
interpreting their common law, statutes, and constitutions to guaran-
tee a 'property' and 'liberty' that even the federal courts must
protect.' '42  Once again, Justice Brennan seems to be thinking
primarily of rights against states. His allusion to "the federal due
process clause" apparently refers to the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on state power.
But another "federal due process clause"--the Fifth
Amendment's-restricts the national government from abusively
exercising power. Thus, a state law creating a property interest also
triggers important restrictions on national officials. Again, the ques-
tion arises whether there are any other mechanisms by which state
laws can protect citizens' constitutional rights against the national
government. To answer this question, we need to rethink sovereignty
and federalism.
II. FEDERALISM'S FUTURE: "CONVERSE-1983"?
'We need to rethink sovereignty and federalism ... " So I
wrote some years ago in an unpublished out-take; and, since then, the
Supreme Court, lo and behold, has begun to rethink sovereignty and
federalism. (Perhaps I should consider nonpublication more often.)
Although the Court's rethinking is still in its early stages and could
yet go awry, I hope that some Justices may be beginning to pivot-at
least rhetorically-in the right direction.
My Exhibit A is the 1991 case, Gregory v. Ashcroft,43 in which
the Court, per Justice O'Connor, built powerfully on precisely those
passages of her FERC dissent that I found most intriguing and prom-
ising in my unpublished out-take." The facts of Gregory are rather
far afield from my immediate concerns and from my more general
interest in a "converse-1983" model of federalism. Far more impor-
tant for my purposes here is what the Court, per Justice O'Connor,
said about federalism. And federalism today appears to have real
bite, for in Gregory, federalism values generated a powerful clear
statement rule narrowing a Congressional statute; and, in a later
case, New York v. United States,45 the Court actually struck down an
42. Id.
43. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
44. See notes 9, 16 and accompanying text.
45. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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act of Congress on federalism grounds-for the first time in over fifty
years46-in an O'Connor opinion that repeatedly invoked Gregory.
In light of Gregory's possible importance, I shall quote from it
at length:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people nu-
merous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportu-
nity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innova-
tion and experimentation in government; and it makes government more re-
sponsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry....
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses
of government power.... Just as the separation and independence of the co-
ordinate Branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumula-
tion of excessive power in any one Branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front. Alexander Hamilton explained to the people of New
York, perhaps optimistically, that the new federalist system would suppress
completely "the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny":
"[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be
entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the
rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to
check usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing
themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their
rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the
instrument of redress." The Federalist No. 28, pp. 180-181 (C. Rossiter,
ed. 1961).
James Madison made much the same point:
"In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America,
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at
the same time that each will be controlled by itself." Id., No. 51, p. 323.47
Justice O'Connor (for the Court) begins this extraordinary pas-
sage of Gregory exactly where Justice O'Connor (in dissent) left off in
FERC, with what I have called the "laboratory" and "political market"
models. She invokes images of states as both Populist and
46. Not counting, of course, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which
Garcia overruled.
47. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458-59.
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Progressive laboratories--"increas[ing] opportunity for citizen in-
volvement in democratic processes" and allowing for more "innovation
and experimentation"--and sharpens the domicile shopping idea of
"decentralized" states "in competition for a mobile citizenry" in ways
that "will be more sensitive to [citizens'] diverse needs."4
But then Justice O'Connor breaks off to begin a new
idea-perhaps a new model of federalism. "Perhaps the principal
benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government
power."49 Exactly so. And what follows is a precisely drawn and self-
conscious analogy between separation of powers and federalism: both
are designed to "reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse."5  This, too, is
just right. Note also how the asymmetric vision of the FERC dissent
has flowered into symmetry: federalism is designed, says the Court,
to reduce the risk of government abuse "from either front"--that is,
from both central and state government.51
Finally, and most remarkably, we come to the Court's powerful
quotations from, and juxtaposition of, key passages from the
Federalist Nos. 28 and 51. Both passages make clear that federalism
is indeed symmetric, and exists to protect citizens' legal rights against
governments. "If their rights are invaded by either [government],
they may make use of the other as the instrument of redress.52
"Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people."53
The Court, in my view, has chosen exactly the right passage of
the famous Federalist No. 51 to highlight, and has juxtaposed it with
precisely the key words of the much less well known Federalist No.
28. Indeed, in the final version of my 1987 essay I quoted and
juxtaposed these same two passages as the cornerstones of my
proposed "converse-1983" model. I described the language of
Federalist No. 28 as "seldom-quoted"--as indeed it then was; before
1987, no court and no law professor, to my knowledge, had ever
quoted or paid much heed to this passage.M But now the United
48. Id. at 458.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 459 (quoting Federalist No. 28).
53. Id. (quoting Federalist No. 51).
54. In the opening chapter of his pathbrealdng 1978 treatise on the Constitution,
Professor Laurence Tribe did feature an important sentence from Federalist No. 28, outside the
passage featured in Gregory and my 1987 article, but in harmony with this passage. Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 3 n.6 (Foundation, 1978). In the political science
literature, the key words from Federalist No. 28 were quoted and discussed in a highly incisive
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States Supreme Court has-in dictum, to be sure-featured this
passage as a central text of American federalism.
What remains, of course, is for the Supreme Court to take that
dictum seriously, and to begin the real work of building a new model
of federalism, a model that I call "converse-1983" and that I have tried
to elaborate at length elsewhere, a model that builds on the Federalist
No. 28 idea that if either government invades the citizen's consti-
tutional rights, the citizen can use the other government as the in-
strument of redress. In that idea lies federalism's original intent,
and-let us pray-federalism's future.
essay by Martin Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, in Essays in Federalism 21, 53
(Institute for Studies in Federalism, Claremont Men's College, 1961).
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